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ABSTRACT
Online auctions play a central role in online advertising, and are
one of the main reasons for the industry’s scalability and growth.
With great changes in how auctions are being organized, such as
changing the second- to first-price auction type, advertisers and
demand platforms are compelled to adapt to a new volatile environ-
ment. Bid shading is a known technique for preventing overpaying
in auction systems that can help maintain the strategy equilibrium
in first-price auctions, tackling one of its greatest drawbacks. In
this study, we propose a machine learning approach of modeling
optimal bid shading for non-censored online first-price ad auctions.
We clearly motivate the approach and extensively evaluate it in
both offline and online settings on a major demand side platform.
The results demonstrate the superiority and robustness of the new
approach as compared to the existing approaches across a range of
performance metrics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the early days of the online advertising, the industry has faced
the challenge of selling and distributing relevant ads to users at
scale. The predominant solution has been to facilitate these efforts
through online auctions organized by ad exchanges. The most
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widely used online auction format has been the generalized second-
price auction (SPA), a powerful medium for advertisers to bid for
reaching their target audiences with relevant product/service ads.
These second-price auctions have become the engine for the online
advertising industry, used for over 20 years, and driving worldwide
advertiser revenues to over $250 Billion in 2018 [6], with more than
$100 billion in the US alone1.
In the second-price auction, when a user places a bid, they are
charged the price of the next highest competing bidder plus (usu-
ally) a penny; so for example, if they bid $5.00, and the next highest
bidder is $2.50, then they are charged $2.51. SPAs exhibit the Vick-
rey property [18], which states that bidding ones true value is a
dominant strategy - meaning that this will produce the best possible
payoff regardless of actions taken by other bidders. In SPAs adver-
tisers may simply focus on calculating the value of the incoming
impression and then bidding that true value.
However, midway through 2017, this situation suddenly changed.
Many ad exchanges began switching to generalized first-price auc-
tions (FPAs), a different bidding format that was very popular in
the first years of online advertising [5]. In January 2017 there were
no known FPAs used by major display ad exchanges [11], while
between January and December 2019, the percent of auctions run-
ning on FPAs had risen from an astonishing 40% [2] to nearly 100%
[8]. Several factors conspired to drive the industry towards the
adoption of the FPA, with the most important ones being increased
demand for transparency and accountability [4, 7, 16]. In the first-
price auction, there would be no possibility of an ad exchange
improperly manipulating the clearing prices, as the price charged
would always be exactly equal to the price offered. FPAs also al-
lowed ad exchanges to capture all of the revenue from buyers since
there would no longer be any discounting; this was an extremely
attractive option for ad exchanges.
However, FPAs also carry some significant problems that were
very notable in the early days of online advertising. They introduce
considerable complexity to bidding systems, in particular because
they do not have the Vickrey property and have no strategy equi-
librium (the easiest way to win an auction is to be fast and frequent
in revising bids with respect to the competitors bids). They are,
thus, susceptible to system gaming strategies by different parties,
which easily create volatile prices that in turn cause allocative
inefficiencies [5].
Most importantly, in first-price auctions there is the fear of over-
paying. If an advertiser bids $5.00 for an impression, and the next
highest competing bid is $2.50, they will get charged $5.00 - but a
strategic bid of $3.00 would save the advertiser money. This means
1https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Full-Year-2018-IAB-Internet-
Advertising-Revenue-Report.pdf, accessed January 2020
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
01
36
0v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
 Se
p 2
02
0
that the bidder has to introduce a whole new system - after calculat-
ing the value of the impression, the bidder then has to adjust their
submitted bid downwards, so that if they win, they are charged only
the minimum necessary to win their bid. Bidding too low though,
increases the chances of not winning the auction at all, hence there
is an intrinsic trade-off between the likelihood of winning and the
payment in case it is won that needs to be taken into account. This
practice of making a final adjustment to the bid price is referred to
in the auction literature as Bid Shading, and it is a frequent practice
in many auction systems such as cattle auctions [14, 21], US trea-
sury auctions [9] and FCC spectrum auctions [3]. The difference
between the advertiser’s private value and shaded bid for won auc-
tions is called the bid surplus, and optimization of this quantity is a
major objective for the advertiser.
Online advertising auctions are dynamic, affected by a range
of external factors, not to mention the arrival and departure of
different bidders, bid shading is thus a very difficult problem.
In this study, we discuss a machine learning based bid shading
approach for open (non-censored) first-price auctions – a type of
auctions where there is a feedback containing minimum bid to win
sent to all participants regardless of an auction outcome. Unlike
closed FPAs where the price of the highest competing bidder is
censored and SPAs where the price is known only for won auctions,
in the open FPAs it is always shared. Moreover, as in the early days
of online advertising, open FPAs are becoming a dominant type of
first-price online auctions with the largest ad exchanges adopting
it early. The main benefit of this type of auctions is that they shed
light on the bidding landscape and competition in such a manner
that demand platforms can fairly and transparently optimize their
surplus and submit appropriate bids.
The approach this study discusses learns from historical non-
censored auction data using features available at the ad opportunity,
so as to estimate the optimal bid shading ratio defined as ratio of the
highest competing bid and calculated bid value. This approach is
successfully deployed in a major Demand Side Platform (DSP), and
we demonstrate its effectiveness in a real production environment,
compared against more traditional approaches, and using a range
of relevant metrics in offline and online settings.
Contribution of this study are enlisted below:
• We propose and characterize the problem and challenges
of estimating the optimal bid shading ratio for the open
(non-censored) first-price online auctions.
• We propose efficient Factorization Machines based approach
for optimizing the bidding surplus to model the historical
auction data and estimate the shading ratio in real time. To
the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to describe
a working bid shading algorithm for bidding systems.
• Improvements of total surplus show 18.57% and 20.54% for
offline results and online results as compared to the existing
models in production.
2 BID SHADING PROBLEM DEFINITION,
RECENTWORK AND CHALLENGES
2.1 Canonical bidding optimization objective
In order to show ads to consumers, advertisers rely on DSPs (such
as Google DoubleClick or Verizon Media DSP) to deploy highly
efficient auction bidding infrastructures and run campaigns and
lines on their behalf. Campaigns and lines can target an activity
(such as click or conversion) and can optimize a range of objectives
such are cost-per-X (view, click, mille, acquisition, install, etc.). Fur-
thermore, each line is evaluated with key performance indicators
(KPIs) which in addition to line objectives can measure total spend,
win rate, etc. Demand platforms are responsible for finding the best
ad opportunities to deliver advertisers’ ads, bidding for those op-
portunities, while spending as much as possible advertisers’ budget
to maximize delivery.
Online ad auction participants can submit a single bid in dollar
value trying to win the opportunity to display an ad to a user. To
achieve this, the following optimization objective (simplified for
brevity) is formalized across all ad opportunities i:
argmax
bi
N∑
i=1
I(bi ) ∗vi
subject to:
N∑
i=1
I(bi ) ∗ ci ≤ B,
(1)
where bi is the bid value, ci is the payment to the exchange if the
auction is won, indicated by I(bi ), andvi is the expected value to the
advertiser of showing the intended ad for impression opportunity i .
Typically, that value is defined in terms of an action associated to the
ad impression, such as a click, view, conversion, etc. For example,
for conversion lines vi = pCVRi ∗ event_value , where pCVRi is
the estimated probability of a conversion, and event_value is the
monetary value of such conversion event. Finally, the constraint is
placed on the optimization function to ensure that the total sum of
impression costs to the advertiser ci does not exceed the budget B
defined for the same time window.
To solve the problem statement in (1), bi is often calculated as:
bi = α ∗vi , (2)
where α is summarizing multiplicative parameter that control the
delivery of a line, i.e. with respect to the bid shading, delivery
pacing and KPIs. Depending on the auction type,bi can be unshaded
(annotated with bui ) or shaded. Bid shading, thus, plays a key role
in deciding on the bid value as a part of multiplicative term α .
2.2 Bid Shading Maximization
For first-price auctions, the optimal bidding strategy f attempts to
decrease (shade) the bid price as much as possible to the minimum
bid necessary to win. This process is called bid shading.
The optimization function of the bid shading can be defined
through maximizing the surplus:
bid surplus =
N∑
i=1
(bui − bi )I(bi ), (3)
where bid bui is the unshaded bid. It should be noted that this
formulation of the problem implies that bid shading is the process
of decreasing the bid value only, as increasing the bid value would
negatively coact with the process of estimating the value of an
impression.
2.3 Prior bid shading algorithms
2.3.1 Supply-side bid shading algorithms. The shift from second
to first-price auctions was extremely rapid, and many advertisers
may have difficulty calculating shading adjustments. To ease the
transition to first-price, a range of ad exchanges have begun to offer
"default bid shading services" to help advertisers who might strug-
gle to implement their own algorithm. Examples include Google’s
ADX “Bid Translation Service” [8], Rubicon’s “Estimated Market
Rate” [15], and AppNexus’s “Bid Price Optimization” system [1].
These services are designed to shade high, private-value-like bids
down to a price at which the advertiser continues to win at an
equivalent rate, but with a less egregious price. While this is a
useful outcome for supply-side platforms, since it ensures impres-
sions continue to sell, whilst avoiding what might be otherwise be
considered “price gouging”, it is most certainly not utility maximiz-
ing for advertisers. These services are only sometimes available,
and discontinuation of these services is imminent once demand
platforms’ bid shading efforts have become sufficiently mature.
2.3.2 Segmented, non-linear shading algorithm. One approach that
is simple but effective, is to estimate the optimal bid shading ratio
using parametric functions of the unshaded bid. The function pa-
rameters are either tuned manually, or algorithmically, based on a
feedback mechanism that tries to maximize surplus. Parameters are
trained for each unique inventory segment, which is represented
as a combination of salient inventory properties such as seller ex-
change, top level domain, and so on. For each of these inventory
segments, historical surplus data is fed back to an algorithm that
adjusts parameter values iteratively, attempting to maximize sur-
plus for that segment. As a benchmark for the new methodology
proposed in this paper, the following parametric function used in
production by the DSP system was considered for both offline and
online experiments:
bi = f (bui ) =
{
log 1+u1∗u2∗b
u
i
u2 u2 > 0
b1 ∗ bui otherwise
(4)
where u1,u2,b1 are the parameters, and bui is the unshaded bid.
The algorithm used to adjust the parameters was a recursive least
square methodology and segments were defined as the combination
of exchange, top level domain, device and layout.
One drawback of the above segment-based, nonlinear approach,
is that segments have to be predetermined and finding a suitable
segment definition requires substantial analysis without being able
to provide optimality guarantees. Another disadvantage is that
information across segments is not shared, which is a problem for
segments that do not have enough traffic.
2.3.3 Related work on bidding landscape prediction. Several ap-
proaches were developed for modeling censored data of SPAs to
estimate the bidding landscape [19, 20]. These approaches have
a goal to directly estimate minimum bid to win, using their bid
price as lower and upper bound when auction is lost and won, re-
spectively, through distributional assumptions (such as Normal or
Gamma) on bid shading landscape. The distributional assumption
can be a very limiting factor in predicting bid landscape as we
show in the following section, and the studies have not shown that
any distribution tested is distinctly the best. Moreover, as these
Figure 1: Diversity of distributions of the highest competing
bid prices for four fixed sets ofWeb page and user attributes.
approaches are developed for the SPAs it would require extending
them to the use case of FPA in order to conduct comparisons.
2.4 Modeling challenges
For traditional machine learning problems such as CTR or CVR
predictions a predictor is trained on established training data, and
the assumption is that available features provide sufficient richness
to describe the problem. Estimating the optimal bid shading factor
for an ad opportunity, on the other hand, relies on not only drawing
insights from historical auction data, but also foreseeing how the
other bidders would play the game. The following challenges are
often barriers when we formulate and solve bid shading problems:
• A large variability of the highest competing bid price. Knowing
the highest competing bid prices as provided by open bid
auctions when bidding for their inventory is crucial piece
of information to know the optimal bid ratio. However, the
distribution of the highest competing bid prices can vary
significantly across different sets as shown in Figure 1. Each
graph in Figure 1 shows the empirical distribution of the
highest competing bid price (per mille) for a set of fixed page
and user attributes, and the differences among different sets
can provide insight into the variability of the problem bid
shading algorithm needs to model.
• Data collection. In order to learn a bid shading strategy, it is
important to log not only won but also lost bids information
which increases storage requirements exponentially.
• One can never step into the same auction twice. Every auc-
tion is unique. Machine learning approaches often make
assumption that the test data will be generated from the
same distribution that generated the training data. How-
ever, in an online ad auction system, ad inventory, end user,
budget, and participating bidders are constantly changing,
which poses challenges for any machine-learning approach.
• Many other factors contribute to the final bid price. Bid shading
is only one step of many in a complex DSP system. For exam-
ple, targeting efforts, CTR/CVR predictions, pacing control,
etc., attempt to make adjustments to the final bid price. A
bid shading algorithm is only useful if it’s resilient to noises
and changes in other parts of the DSP system.
3 EMAND PLATFORM BID SHADING SYSTEM
OVERVIEW
We provide a system overview of the Verizon Media DSP which
is one of the major DSPs in the US and the World with more than
200 billion daily requests received from more than 40 different ad
exchanges. The DSP’s production ad serving system workflow (of
which the bid shading module is part of) is shown in Figure 2. On the
left side of the DSP bidder we can see the sequence of events that
occur for each ad opportunity generated by a user. User generates
visits a web page, Supply Side Platform (SSP) generates ad request
and sends it to several DSP’s, the DSP will provide a first-price bid
and it will receive information of minimum bid to win regardless
of the bidding outcome. If bid was won, ad impression is made and
logged in the data store together with the ad exchange feedback.
On the backend side of the demand platform, a feature generating
process is run with training machine learning model to predict
optimal shading factor for different impressions once a day. The
model is stored into a model file loaded by host machines in the bid
shading module of the DSP bidder to be used in the following bid
requests made by different SSP’s.
Figure 2: Overview of the bid shading in the bid generation
system.
Requirements and limitations for predictive approaches. This par-
ticular system setup allows for the models to be trained on very
large datasets and stored in formats optimized for efficient serving
in a very limited bid request response time frame. During the to-
tal allowable 20ms response time, multiple modules needed to go
through one by one including targeting, click/conversion predic-
tion, internal auction, value capping, bid shading and others. The
current programmatic bidding system in Verizon Media does not
support parallel processing of these modules, which results in strict
latency constraints of each module that we take into consideration
during machine learning modeling phase.
4 PREDICTING THE OPTIMAL SHADING
RATIO
4.1 Methodologies
In this section we describe the Factorization Machines (FM) model
whose objective is to estimate the optimal bid shading ratio defined
as the bid price divided by the minimum bid to win on historical
bidding data. We then provide details of the loss function used
designed to ensure surplus maximization.
4.1.1 Factorization Machines. Factorization Machines are a pop-
ular and efficient model used in recommendation systems. They
have been very successfully used in applications involving sparse
data such as CTR [10, 13] and CVR [12] estimation outperforming
popular second-degree polynomial models, while they maintain
a terrific property of having only quadratic floating-operations
complexity O(N 2) in the space of data fields (N ). With their high
efficiency and effectiveness they are the approach that performs
while complying with strict deployment restrictions discussed in
Section 3.
FMs learn aweightwi and an embedding vectorvi ∈ RK for each
feature to model both its main effect and its interaction effects with
other features, respectively. The interaction between two features i
and j is modeled as the dot product ⟨vi ,vj ⟩ of their corresponding
embedding vectorsvi ,vj . The formula is shown in Eq. 5:
ΦFM ((w,v),x) = w0 +
m∑
i=1
xiwi +
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=i+1
xix j ⟨vi ,vj ⟩ (5)
Here, K is the dimension of the embedding vectors, and it’s usually
a small integer, in our experiments 10.
The reason behind FMs success is that it can always learn some
meaningful embedding vector for each feature as long as the feature
itself appears enough times in the data, whichmakes the dot product
a good estimate of the interaction effect of two features even if they
have never or seldom occurred together in the data.
4.1.2 Loss function and optimization. Provided that the model’s
objective is to estimate the optimal bid shading ratio as its target y,
a natural choice for a loss function was mean squared error loss:
L = 1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi − ΦFM (w,v),xi ))2 (6)
However, the goal of the algorithm like this would be only to
match the optimal bid shading ratio, whereas our goal is also to
maximize the bidding surplus, spend more, and improve win rate. To
that end we designed an asymmetric loss function [17] that:
• Treats win/loss differently by penalizing more when we
overshade and loose the bid, thus optimizing win rate and
spend
• Has different loss weights for different bid requests such
as penalizing less the higher bid surplus accumulation is
achieved, thus optimizing the bidding surplus
• Has a ready capping hyperparameter that allows control
over the penalty – the more penalty when losing the bids
will result in overall higher shading factor, higher win rate,
and more spend. And vice versa.
We extend the simple quadratic loss function by imposing asym-
metry between over-prediction and under-prediction as:
L = 1
N
N∑
i=1
[(yi − ΦFM (w,v),xi ))2 ∗ |IΦi<yi + α |] , (7)
where
Ix =
{
1 if x ≥ 0
−1 if x < 0 , (8)
and the optimization function becomes:
L = 1
N
N∑
i=1
[
(yi − ΦFM (w,v),xi ))2 ∗
{1 + α if loss of the bid1 − α if win of the bid ] .
(9)
The parameter α ∈ (0, 1) indicates the degree of asymmetry.
For instance, if α > 0 the model suffers more loss from under-
prediction than from over-prediction. The further α is from 0, the
more asymmetric the model’s preference between under-prediction
and over-prediction is. In our definition, α is obtained as:
α = min(1,max(opt_surplus,γ )),γ ∈ (0, 1), (10)
where
opt_surplus = price before shading - minimum price to win (11)
is normalized to [0, 1] scale to match the range of α . The hyperpa-
rameter γ used for flooring α by allowing a small manual control
over the shading factor predictions in the production. We thus re-
tain control over some performance metrics not included in the
loss function above to preserve its generalization across different
demand platform optimization goals.
Parameters (w,v) can be easily trained end-to-end through stan-
dard gradient descent approaches as the proposed asymmetric loss
function preserves the smoothness of the MSE loss.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A detailed analysis in both offline and online setting of the proposed
methodology as compared against several baselines across different
metrics is provided here.
All algorithms have been trained on a sample of 7 days of data
and evaluated on the next day using won bids only. The datasets
sample approximately has 9 million auction feedback per day. We
are not using the feedback from auctions that were lost, because in
the current bidding system definition (Section 2.1), the bid shading
function is supposed to optimize only the bid surplus given the
bid value determined through other modules, thus only lowering
the bid price is allowed (i.e. we do not wish to pay for opportunity
more that it is worth).
For input features algorithms use as inputs to predict the optimal
shading ratio for each ad opportunity we are using 13 publisher
and context fields available during the ad call:
• Publisher fields: Paдe_TLD, Subdomain, Publisher_ID and
Request_publisher_ID,
• Context fields: Country_ID, Day_o f _Week , Hour_o f _Day,
Device_type_ID,App_name , Is_new_user ,Tarдet_deal_ID,
Layout_ID and Ad_position_ID.
These 13 fields amount to hundreds of thousands of total cate-
gorical features used by the algorithms.
5.1 Baselines
For the machine learning approaches, we considered the follow-
ing: 1) Linear regression (LR), 2) Multi Layer Perceptron regression
(MLP) and 3) Factorization Machines regression (FM). All algo-
rithms are optimized using the aforedescribed asymmetric loss
function.
5.2 Metrics
Below we describe a spectrum of metrics used to evaluate perfor-
mance of the bid shading algorithms from perspectives of regression
performance and demand platform performance metrics.
5.2.1 Regression performance metrics. Selected metrics for evalu-
ating regression performance of proposed algorithms in this study
are:
• Mean Squared Error (MSE):
MSE =
1
N
n∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi )2 (12)
• Coefficient of determination (r2):
r2 =
nΣxy − ΣxΣy√
(nΣx 2 − (Σx )2)(nΣy2 − (Σy )2)
(13)
5.2.2 Demand platform performance metrics. The proposed regres-
sion task metrics do not encapsulate the most important aspects
of the performance of the bid shading system. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2, the bid shading is actually a process of optimizing the eq. 3.
To that end we propose the following metrics of evaluation (using
the consistent notation) that we will consider the main performance
metrics:
• Total surplus per bid response:
surplus =
N∑
i=1
(bui − bi )IB∗ (bi ) (14)
• Total spend:
total_spend =
N∑
i=1
bi IB∗ (bi ) (15)
• Win rate:
win_rate = 1
N
N∑
i=1
IB∗ (bi ) (16)
• Cost per mille (CPM):
CPM =
1
N
N∑
i=1
bi IB∗ (bi ) (17)
Results reported on these metrics are percentage improvements
or increases as compared to production’s non linear bid shading
algorithm (Section 2.3.2) as absolute numbers could not be disclosed.
5.3 Offline experiments and analysis
In this section, we will analyze the performance of the machine
learning based approaches using both regression metrics and de-
mand platform performance metrics in an offline setting using the
retrospective analysis. This will allow us to very easily characterize
algorithmic performance on the available data, as well as to do a
deeper dive into goal type performance analysis and fine-tuning of
hyperparameters.
5.3.1 Machine learning based approaches and their performance.
On the described dataset we train the three mentioned machine
learning based approaches, characterize their regression perfor-
mance and finally compare their individual improvements against
the production baseline. The regression performance is aimed to
evaluate how well the algorithms fit the data, which, in the setup
proposed in this study, means predicting the competitive landscape,
a very difficult task indeed given a large number of demand plat-
forms and highly variable number of external lines and ads that
could potentially target the current opportunity. This is clearly
reflected in lower r2 values on all algorithms, however its positivity
shows that models can still capture some of the large variability of
the bid shading signal.
Figure 3: MSE and r2 performance
metrics for the three machine learn-
ing based approaches.
For the regres-
sion metrics (Fig-
ure 3) we can see
that there is a
distinction among
the algorithms (es-
pecially in terms
of the r2 metric)
where the MLP
approach had the
worst performance,
while the proposed
FM approach had
the best perfor-
mance. We sus-
pect that the com-
bination of exist-
ing features does
not provide asmuch
as predictive in-
formation as does modeling heterogeneity of each feature (i.e.
through the feature learning layer in the FM model).
More interesting results are shown in Table 1, where the three
machine learning based approaches are directly compared against
the non-linear bid shading used in production on surplus, spend,
win rate and CPM metrics. Across the board we can see that each
machine learning based approach outperforms the nonlinear bid
shader on surplus, total spend and win rate. The CPM metric is
naturally increased with the increase of spend and win rate and in
production environment its value is controlled in several goal type
lines such as eCPM which we will show in our online experiments.
Moreover we additionally control the balance between spend and
CPM increase through hyperparameters of the algorithms (in par-
ticular the γ parameter) which we discuss in Section 5.3.3. The
highest surplus and win rate improvements are obtained with the
factorization machine approach yielding second highest spend at a
bit higher CPM increase than of the linear regression.
5.3.2 Performance analysis per demand platforms’ goal type. Fur-
ther characterization of the performance of different models can
be done per goal types lines are optimizing towards, primarily be-
cause of the two following reasons: 1) the bid price calculation is
slightly different for each goal type and 2) each goal type can have
different control signals. The goal types of particular interest on
Surplus imp. Spend imp. CPM inc. Win rate impr.
LR 17.20% 128.63% 67.56% 36.40%
MLP 16.18% 136.67% 73.85% 36.12%
FM 18.57% 133.02% 70.82% 36.40%
Table 1: Improvements across surplus, total spend, win rate
and increase of the CPM expressed in percentages over the
nonlinear bid shading production baseline as obtained by
the three machine learning based approaches.
the platform with their prevalence on the test set are None goal
type with 40.5% and five CP-X goals – CPC (click) with 12.12%, CPA
(action) with 38.95%, CPCV (completed view) with 0.57%, CPViewI
(viewed impressions) with 0.78% and eCPM (mille) with 3.60%.
Again, we separate the evaluation of algorithms into regression
and platform performance metrics and show the performance of
the proposed FM model as the best performing model. Regression
metrics per goal type are shown in Fig. 4. We can see that regression
performance does vary per line type, where the performance is most
aligned with the overall results for two dominant goal types – None
and CPA. It is expected for the performance numbers to drop for
goal types that have a very small yet non-negligible share of the
serving opportunities due to the inherent noise of the problem.
Figure 4: MSE and r2 performance metrics for the Factoriza-
tion Machine algorithm broken down by the goal type.
Furthermore, once we analyze the performance of the FM-based
bid shading approach against the nonlinear production baseline
across surplus, total spend, win rate and CPM we can clearly see
that there are improvements on the key metrics. Moreover, as the
highest increase in surplus we observe is for the CPA goal which
typically has the highest prices, we can concur that better shading
can deliver gains in practice for advertisers targeting sophisticated,
rare, and high-priced goals. But also for goal types with smaller
values such as eCPM, or even CPC, where shading has fewer degrees
of freedom to pick and chose how to adjust the price we can clearly
see that there is added value. As a result of this analysis, we can
conclude that the FM model provides a clear advantage over the
production model across different goal types.
Figure 5: Improvements across surplus, total spend, win rate
and increase of the CPM expressed in percentages over Non-
linear bid shading production baselines obtained by the Fac-
torization Machine model broken down by the goal type.
5.3.3 Using parameter γ to control the performance metrics. For
successful deployment in production environment we allowed a
control over the algorithm through parameter γ acting as a floor to
asymmetric parameter α . By changing γ we can have a control over
models performance, i.e. choosing one with the best bid surplus or
lowest CPM. This parameter is meant to select themodel parameters
that will be aligned with the control signals of production system.
For the FM algorithm, we searched for the best γ parameter by
increments of 0.2 (results shown in Table 2). In this experiment
γ value 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Surplus impr. 17.77% 18.57% 17.51% 17.31% 17.20% 17.49%
Spend impr. 144.02% 133.02% 146.57% 148.27% 149.30% 147.28%
CPM inc. 75.24% 70.82% 75.65% 76.01% 76.25% 75.83%
Win rate impr. 39.25% 36.40% 40.36% 41.03% 41.42% 40.61%
Table 2: Impact of γ parameter evaluated across 6 values on
0.2 increment for the Factorization Machine algorithm.
we obtained the highest surplus improvement and the lowest CPM
increase at γ = 0.2 operating point, while the highest total spend
and win rate are obtained at γ = 0.8 operating point, at the cost of
the highest CPM increase and lowest surplus improvement. With
respect to the criteria described above, we selected γ = 0.2 as a
parameter for all algorithms throughout the experiments.
Using the asymmetric loss function with γ = 0.2 compared
to symmetric mean square error yielded an increase of 0.1% and
decrease of 1.2% for MSE and r2, respectively, while it provided a
increase of 6% for total surplus, and a 6.6% decrease of CPM (with
<10% decrease in win rate and spend suggesting that this approach
focuses more on higher value bids).
5.4 Online experiments and analysis
Offline experiments were able to show retroactive performance of
the proposed bid shading approach while lacking any interaction
with the other modules of the system. Finally, we discuss perfor-
mance of the proposed bid shading strategy in the online setting.
Figure 6: Performance metrics improvements and increases
(expressed in percentages) for LR and FM model as com-
pared to the nonlinear bid shared collected from separate
serving buckets (A/B test).
The two LR and two FM models were deployed on distinct servers
(we removed MLP model due to its high computational cost and
poor performance in offline experiments), serving independent
traffic and performance was monitored over several days.
5.4.1 Online A/B test. In terms of online AB tests, we aggregated
results for both LR and FM models and compared them to the
randomly selected traffic volume of same scale. Results obtained by
the two models as compared to non-linear bid shading approach are
given in Figure 6. Online results are similar to the offline results in
terms of relative ranking of models, with the proposed FM approach
being the best one. However, thanks to the online serving control
the online setting provided similar or better surplus improvements
but at a much lower CPM increase (< 10% compared to > 70% in the
offline counterparts). This behavior is very desirable as the machine
learning based bid shading module is capable of playing well into
the system providing desired improvements on key metrics.
5.4.2 Online A/A/B/B tests. To test the stability, we separately
aggregated performance of the two algorithms across different
servers and thus created an A/A/B/B test. In Fig. 7 we can see that
the performance increases compared to the non linear bid shader
is very similar between servers running the same algorithm, be
it LR or FM model. We can thus strengthen the claim that the
performance measured of any of the algorithms was not a fluke.
Finally we ran a similar setup of experiments only per goal
type (similarly to the offline counterpart) with sufficient traffic
available for the best performing FM model. Figure 8 shows that
across different goal types and across two different servers, the
FM model provides very stable and high increase in bid surplus,
total spend and win rate, while maintaining relatively low CPM
increase (< 10%). With the last online A/A/B/B test we conclude
that the machine learning based bid shading approach using the FM
model is superior to any other approach considered for the demand
platform’s bidding system, and that it provides a significant value
of allowing the strategy equilibrium in the non-censored first-price
auctions.
Figure 7: Performance metrics improvements and increases
(expressed in percentages) for LR and FM model as com-
pared to the nonlinear bid shading collected from two dif-
ferent servers each showing stability of performance of ML-
based approach (A/A/B/B test).
Figure 8: Performance metrics improvements and increases
(expressed in percentages) for the FM model across 6 avail-
able goal types as compared to the nonlinear bid shared col-
lected from three separate serving buckets (A/A/B/B test).
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this study, we focused on describing the problem of estimating
optimal shading factor using machine learning models designed for
the non-censored type of first-price auctions, which are becoming
thewidespread type for online advertising. The bid shading problem
under such circumstances becomes a point estimate problem with
many opportunities and challenges. We described an approach that
fitted well within DSP’s production environment and performed
exceptionally. The proposed FM approach with asymmetric loss
function provided valuable improvements over other approaches
both non-linear shading and machine learning based in both offline
and online settings. The proposed approach brought improvements
in estimated surplus of 18.57% and 20.54% in offline and online
setting respectively, while providing stability of performance per
goal type and also on A/A tests in an online setting. However
many challenges still remain: Different goal types weight metrics
differently which could be taken into account when modeling;
furthermore, using information from bids lost could be used to
improve total spend and performance for lines by modeling the
bidding competition.
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